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A ‘subject-determining platitude’ about colour

Here are three patches of colour. The patches are all different colours, but the two leftmost are both the same colour---they are both blue. This sounds contradictory but isn't. In one case we're talking about the particular colours of things, which I’ll call ‘shades’; in the other case we're talking about colour category.
Today my focus is not the shades but the categorical colour properties, properties like red, green and blue.

2.5B

7.5BG

2.5BG

It has been quite widely accepted (among philosophers, at least) that: % \begin{quote} ‘If someone with normal color vision looks at a tomato in good light, the tomato will appear to have a distinctive property—a property that strawberries and cherries also appear to have, and which we call ‘red’ in English’ \citep[p.\ 4]{byrne:2003_color} \end{quote} % Claims such as this are sometimes treated as common ground in controversies about colour.
‘If someone with normal color vision looks at a tomato in good light, the tomato will appear to have a distinctive property—a property that strawberries and cherries also appear to have, and which we call ‘red’ in English’ \citep[p.\ 4]{byrne:2003_color}

‘If someone with normal color vision looks at a tomato in good light, the tomato will appear to have a distinctive property—a property that strawberries and cherries also appear to have, and which we call ‘red’ in English’

(Byrne & Hilbert 2003, p. 4)

It is a ‘subject-determining platitude’ that ‘“red” denotes the property of an object putatively presented in visual experience when that object looks red’, and likewise for other colour terms.

(Jackson 1996, pp. 199–200)

It is a ‘subject-determining platitude’ that ‘“red” denotes the property of an object putatively presented in visual experience when that object looks red’, and likewise for other colour terms \citep[pp.\ 199--200]{Jackson:1996zz}.
Is this true? Does ‘“red” denote the property of an object putatively presented in visual experience when that object looks red’?

Question:

Does ‘“red” denote the property of an object putatively presented in visual experience when that object looks red’?

Simplifying assumptions:

1. There is a property denoted by ‘red’ which some objects have; call this property red.

2. If the property red (say) is presented in visual experience, then things which have this property thereby differ in visual appearance from things which do not have it.

Question (reformulated):

Do red things differ in visual appearance from non-red things?