Automatic belief-tracking in adults and
belief-tracking in infants are both subject to signature limits
associated with minimal theory of mind
(\citealp{wang:2015_limits,Low:2012_identity,low:2014_quack,mozuraitis:2015_privileged};
contrast \citealp{scott:2015_infants}).
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.25\textwidth]{fig/signature_limits_table.png}
\end{center}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.3\textwidth]{fig/low_2012_fig.png}
\end{center}
drawn from Low & Watts (2013); Low et al (2014)
Here are standard anticipatory looking and looking time responses
(Since they are approximately the same and this is rough, I'm only
giving you one bar for both measures)
drawn from Low & Watts (2013); Low et al (2014)
Now look at what happens when we change the task to an identity/appearance task.
drawn from Low & Watts (2013); Low et al (2014)
And this isn't because the subjects are confused:
the switch from location to identity/appearance has no measurable effect
on explicit verbal responses.
Just say that you can do this with other stimuli and paradigms, and we
have done this with infants and would like to do it with adults.
These findings complicate the picture: is helping driven by automatic processes only?
If not, why do we predict that the signature limit of minimal theory of mind
is found in this case too?
Edwards and Low, 2017 figure 7a
Edwards and Low, 2017 figure 7a
Edwards and Low, 2017 figure 7a
Scott et al (2015, figure 2b)
Scott and colleagues \citep{scott:2015_infants} provided other evidence
suggesting that infants’ mindreading may be relatively sophisticated.
Specifically, 17-month-olds watched a thief attempt to steal a preferred
object (a rattling toy) when its owner was momentarily absent by substituting
it with a less-preferred object (a non-rattling toy). Infants looked longer
when the thief substituted the preferred object with a non-visually-matching
silent toy compared to when the thief substituted it with a visually-matching
silent toy. The authors postulated that infants can ascribe to the thief an
intention to implant in the owner a false-belief about the identity of the
substituted toy. The authors further suggested that infants make such ascriptions
only when the substitution involves a visually-matching toy and the owner will
not test whether the toy rattles on her return.
However, Scott et al.’s \citep{scott:2015_infants} explanations also
require postulating that infants take the thief to be strikingly inept;
despite having opportunity simply to pilfer from a closed box known to
contain at least three rattling toys, the thief engages in elaborate
deception which will be uncovered whenever the substituted toy is next
shaken and the thief, as sole suspect, easily identified. A further
difficulty is that factors unrelated to the thief’s mental states vary
between conditions, such as the frequencies with which toys visually matching
one present during the final phase of the test trial have rattled. These
considerations jointly indicate that further evidence would be needed to
support the claim that humans’ early mindreading capacity enables them to
ascribe intentions concerning false beliefs involving numerical identity.
Objection:
‘the theoretical arguments offered [...] are [...] unconvincing, and [...]
the data can be explained in other terms’
(\citealp{carruthers:2015_two}; see also \citealp{carruthers:2015_mindreading}).
‘A cooperative multi-system architecture is better able to explain infant belief representation than a
parallel architecture, and causal representation, schemas and models provide a more promising basis
for flexible belief representation than does a rule-based approach of the kind described by Butterfill
and Apperly’ (\citealp{christensen:_twoa}; see also \citealp{michael:2016_flexible,michael:2013_mindreading}).