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Question 2: Dissociations

second complication : dissociations in performance

‘the present evidence may constitute an implicit understanding of belief’

\citep[p.~113]{krupenye:2016_great}

Krupenye et al, 2016 p. 113

studytypesuccess?
Call et al, 1999object choice (coop)fail
Krachun et al, 2009‘chimp chess’
(competitive, action)		fail
Krachun et al, 2009‘chimp chess’
(competitive, gaze)		pass A,
fail B
Krachun et al, 2010change of contentsfail
Krupenye et al, 2017anticipatory looking
(2 scenarios)		pass both
Commenting on their success in showing that great apes can track false beliefs, Krupenye et al comment that ...
Why do they say ‘implicit’?
I think it’s because they expect dissociations: just as there are dissociations among different measures of mindreading in adults, and developmental dissociations, so it is plausible that there will turn out to be dissociations concerning the tasks that adult humans and adult nonhumans can pass.
Indeed, we can see signs of dissociations if we go back to earlier work with great apes by Karla Krachun and colleagues ...
Invoking implicit cannot explain the dissociations because you could have just as well invoked implicit for a completely different pattern of findings.
Three questions: \begin{enumerate} \item How do observations about tracking support conclusions about representing? \item Why are there dissociations in nonhuman apes’, human infants’ and human adults’ performance on belief-tracking tasks? \item Why is belief-tracking in adults sometimes but not always automatic? (And how could belief-tracking ever be automatic if it significantly depends on working memory and consumes attention?) \end{enumerate}

Q1

How do observations about tracking support conclusions about representing models?

Q2

Why are there dissociations in nonhuman apes’, human infants’ and human adults’ performance on belief-tracking tasks?

Q3

Why is belief-tracking in adults sometimes but not always automatic? How could belief-tracking be automatic given evidence that it significantly depends on working memory and consumes attention?

So now we have a second question to answer
We shouldn’t draw conclusions about mindreading from tracking before we can answer at least these two questions.
Ooops, I almost forgot to mention dissociation in humans ... I’m not going to mention infants much, but we’ll see evidence that’s relevant to adults later