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Appendix: Do you visually experience red because you call things ‘red’?

“surprising it would be indeed if I have a perceptual experience as of red because I call the perceived object ‘red’.

\citep[pp.~324--5]{Stokes:2006fd}.

(Stokes 2006, pp. 324--5)

Stokes makes this observation in passing. I want to show that what Stokes finds so suprising is true, or would be if it were true that red things differ in visual appearance from non-red things.
Stokes has formulated things badly here. The important thing isn’t the particular word I use, ‘red’ vs, say, ‘rot’, ‘rosso’ or ‘rose’. Rather it’s that I have a label for the perceived object which I also use for all the things that have the property red.
Argument: \begin{enumerate} \item Red things differ in visual appearance from non-red things. \item The capacity to detect the difference in visual appearance between red and non-red things is, or depends on, the capacity to visually discriminate red and non-red things. \item The capacity to visually discriminate red and non-red things depends on the capacity to label the red things (for example, using ‘red’). \end{enumerate} Therefore: \begin{enumerate}[resume] \item I have a perceptual experience as of red span.italic because span I call the perceived object ‘red’. \end{enumerate}

1. Red things differ in visual appearance from non-red things.

[assumption]

2. The capacity to detect the difference in visual appearance between red and non-red things is, or depends on, the capacity to visually discriminate red and non-red things.

[unargued premise]

3. The capacity to visually discriminate red and non-red things depends on the capacity to label the red things (for example, using ‘red’).

[discovery]

It turns out that the ability to discriminate properties denoted by particular colour terms like ‘red’ depends not only on having learned to use those very terms accurately in the past \citep{Ozgen:2002yk,Winawer:2007im,zhou:2010_newly} but also on being able to activate some component of the ability to apply the colour term at the time a stimulus is presented \citep{Roberson:2000ge,Pilling:2003bi,Wiggett:2008xt}. % page refs: (Roberson, Davies and Davidoff 2000: 985; Pilling, Wiggett, et al. 2003: 549-50; Wiggett and Davies 2008) Someone who accepts that there are visual experiences as of \emph{red} must either suppose that these experiences are only indirectly related to abilities to discriminate or else accept the surprising idea that such visual experiences are a consequence of covert labelling. This dilemma can be avoided by rejecting the subject-determining platitude and with it the existence in humans of visual experiences as of \emph{red}.

Therefore:

4. I have a perceptual experience as of red because I call the perceived object ‘red’.

Should we reject this ...
... or this (or both)?